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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
\'

ROBERT P. PACHECO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

JOHN "'\V. TURNER, 'Varden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
12910

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Robert P. Pacheco, appeals from
the decision of the Third Judicial District Court denying his release from the Utah State Prison upon a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Hobert P. Pacheco, filed a Complaint
and Petition seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging he is being illegally and unlawfully restrained of
his liberty. The matter was heard on the 4th day of April,
1972, before Judge Joseph Jeppson. Appellant's peti-
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tion
. was denied on the grounds that all allegati'ons
without merit.
-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The state submits that this Court should affinr
the decision of the Third J uclicial District Court.

STA'l'El\IENT OF THE FACTS
The state adopts appellant's statement of factrn
cept as hereinafter set forth.
Appellant's cmmsel at his original trial, l\Jr. Ja:
lfarney, testified that he did not recall discussing
habitual criminal statute with l\Ir. Pacheco. (R. 50)
l\Ir. Barney further testified that the habitual criminfil
statute did not influence his decision to recommend
l\'Ir. Pacheco plead guilty to the lesser offense of at·
tempted burglary. (R. 49, 50)

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT AP·
PELL.ANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS ANY·
BUT YOLUNTARILY AND
LIGEXTL Y _l\IADE.
Realizing that a guilty plea has the same final
f ect as a conviction upon conclusion of a jury trial.
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courts have, of necessity, been required to assure themselves completely that the plea was made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the charge and of
the effect of the plea. Because of this precautionary
practice there has <leveloped a presumption that such
guilty pleas are rnlid. Guglielrnctti v. Turner, 27 U.2d
341, 4% P.2d 261, 262 (1972). This presumption of
validity places the .burden of proof on appellant and
courts of appeal sitting in review of the plea proceedi•ws, as the District Court <lid an<l the Utah Supreme
Court now must do in this case, have set aside judgments only upon a strong showing of proof. In Sheltun
v. Li nitcd States, 246 F.2<l 571, .575 ( 1957), a case cited
by appellant, the court said that upon a motion to vacate
judgment and set aside a plea of guilty:
"The burden of proof is on the rnovant to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that he has been deprived of some right under
the Constitution ... " (Emphasis added.)
The court said further:
"To constitute a sufficient reason for
withdrawal of a plea, the circumstances must
amount to a fraud or imposition upon the def endant ... "
The recent Utah case of Guguelmetti v. Turner, 1upra,
said at page 263:
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"H aheas Corpus is a civil proceeding, and
the petitioner has a burden of showing unlawful restraint."
Respondent submits that appellant has not met his
hmde11 of proving that he is unjustly and unconstitutionally restrained of his liberty. Appellant claims that
his connsel, l\Ir. Jay Barney, coerced him by threatening him with the possibility of being convicted as an
habitual criminal. To support this a vague statement
of l\Jr. Barney to the effect that he may h:we indicated
to appellant that he could be convicted of the habitual
criminal charge is lifted out of context awl offered as
appellant's attempt to meet his burden of proof. In
light of other testimony by l\Ir. Barney, this is not a
preponderance of the evidence as required by Shcltonv.
United States, supra, and case law in general.
A look at l\Ir. Barney's entire testimony shows that
the habitual criminal statute was not a factor in the process of deciding to plead guilty. l\lr. Barney testified
that:
". . . in my opinion it appeared the likelihood of conviction in any one of the three cases
was oaood, and rather than run the risk of betried on three cases ' or beina
found guilty
l·rw
0
0
and servino·
time
on
three
cases,
I believe I
0
made a recommendation to him that if he
could manage it that it would be better to take
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a plea to a lesser offense, or one of the offenses." ( ll. 49)
The United States Supreme Court said in the case of
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441
(1970):
"That a guilty plea must be intelligently
made is not a· requirement that all advice offered by defendant's lawyer withstand retrospective examination on a post-conviction hearmg.

A defendant's guilty plea, based upon
reaso11ahly competent advice is an intelligent
plea not open to attack on the ground that
counsel may have misjudged."

In that case, defendant plead guilty, even though he

knew that the only good evidence against him was his

inadmissible confession. The judgment on the plea was
upheld. 1\Ir. Barney's advice, as stated above, in light
of the actual possibility of subsequent convictions, was
easily within the category of "reasonably competent"
advice. The following testimony of l\ir. Barney further indicates that his advice was not coercive and
threatening as appellant contends:
Q. Was one of the conversations on
which you based your judgment the possibil-
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ity of the State filing a habitual criminal
charge against l\Ir. Pacheco?
A.

Not to my recollection.

Q. Do you recall discussing the habitual
criminal statute with l\Ir. Pacheco?
A. Not specifically, though that is possible. ( R. 50)
A later answer of .l\Ir. Barney to this same line of que1·
tioning stated:
A. '\That I said was that I recall that he
had one felony conviction for which he was
either on parole at that time or was out of
prison, that there were two other charges, and
that it is possible that if he were convicted on
one of the offenses, and the second offense or
third offense were brought, that the habitual
offender act might be invoked on that. I say
that as a possible circumstance, though I never
talked about it s pccifically with him. (R. 50)
(Emphasis added.)
In light of l\Ir. ]Jamey's entire testimony, it cannot be said that a preponderance of the evidence show'
l\Ir. Barney coerced appellant by use of the habituw
criminal act.
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CONCLUSION
As the transcript of the plea proceeding indicates,
appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to trial and e11terecl a plea of guilty. Because of the presumption of validity of this plea proceeding and appellant's failure to meet his burden of proof on this Petition for ·writ of Habeas Corpus by a preponderance
of the evidence, the state respectfully submits that the
decision of the Third District Court, denying appellant's
petition, should be upheld.

Respectfully submitted, ·
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
WILLIAM T. EV ANS
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

